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May 25, 1960

MEMORANDUM

**SUBJECT:** Discussion at the 445th Meeting  
of the National Security Council,  
Tuesday, May 24, 1960

Present at the 445th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director and the Deputy Director (Staats), Bureau of the Budget; and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency (Washburn); the Assistant to the President; the Special Assistants to the President for Foreign Economic Policy, National Security Affairs, Science and Technology, and Security Operations Coordination; the Under Secretary of State (Dillon); the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Douglas); Assistant Secretary of State Gerard C. Smith; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Huntington Sheldon, Central Intelligence Agency (Item 1); the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; Mr. Bryce Harlow, Mr. Charles Haskins, NSC; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES

The President said that this day was the anniversary of the death of John Foster Dulles. He had sent a note to Mrs. Dulles telling her that the Council remembered Mr. Dulles and held him in high respect. The President suggested that the Record of Actions contain a notation along these lines.

The National Security Council:

Noted that the President was writing a letter to Mrs. John Foster Dulles today, telling her that all members of the National Security Council were remembering the former Secretary of State on this first anniversary of his death, and his great service to this Council.

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E.O. 12356, SEC. 3.4(b)

Agency Case NSC F 89-106  
NLE Case 78-22487  
By JH NLE Date 1/17/41

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2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles said that while it was difficult to predict the future actions of Khrushchev, certain developments since the Soviet Premier departed from Paris might shed some light on the current Soviet position. Apparently at the time Khrushchev left Paris he was undecided on his future course of action and wished to leave the door open to various alternatives. In his relatively moderate speech on Friday, Khrushchev had re-assured the West that he did not intend to revert to the hard Stalin line in foreign policy. This re-assurance to the West had been a disappointment to Khrushchev's East German audience. Khrushchev's speech had been postponed a whole day, suggesting that cooler second thoughts might have prevailed after the departure of Khrushchev from Paris. On Khrushchev's return to Moscow, the customary homecoming speech was omitted for the first time in several years. Soviet propaganda is now echoing Khrushchev's Berlin speech, making harsh comments on the President and the Administration and insisting that because the American people are peace loving, a new Summit Conference can be held six to eight months from now. The massive Soviet jamming of the Voice of America, which began early last week, has now been abandoned in favor of a more selective jamming; in fact, jamming has been reduced from about eighty per cent to about twenty per cent of VOA broadcasts. There are no indications that the projected reduction of Soviet military forces will be cancelled. *PRAVDA* has stated that there will be no increase in the Soviet military budget. Khrushchev's promise to delay concluding a treaty with East Germany was more explicit than necessary. Accordingly, from all the above facts Mr. Dulles had the general impression that Khrushchev was attempting to prevent a worsening of the international situation. Mr. Dulles thought it was possible that Khrushchev was covering his rear while dealing with problems in the USSR and in the Soviet Bloc. Mr. Dulles added that he had just heard that the U.S. C-47 plane forced down in East Germany and its passengers were being returned by the USSR.

Mr. Dulles felt that the collapse of the Summit Conference was bound to have repercussions in the Soviet Union and was sure to affect Khrushchev's position in some way. Much would depend on Khrushchev's ability to dominate the Russian leaders who fear a detente with the West. Khrushchev has undoubtedly felt pressure from these leaders and has made concessions to them in the past. Mr. Dulles recalled that at Paris Khrushchev had openly stated that his handling of the U-2 incident was influenced by the internal politics of the Soviet Union. The Soviet people, Mr. Dulles continued, have been led to believe that their prosperity is related to a detente with the West. There

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is reason to believe that Khrushchev may have serious problems within the Kremlin and that a controversy over the handling of the U-2 incident took place in the Soviet hierarchy. Mr. Dulles believed that the Soviet leaders decided early in May to play up the U-2 incident and to call off the visit of the President to the USSR. On May 12 or 13, after the U.S. had issued its statement indicating that reconnaissance over-flights of the USSR had high-level U.S. approval, the Soviet leaders apparently decided to wreck the Summit Meeting. One indication of an early Soviet decision to cancel the President's invitation to visit the USSR is the fact that the magazine, USSR, was supposed to carry in its next issue an article welcoming the President but on May 6 the presses were stopped and new pages were printed to replace the welcoming article.

Secretary Hexter said Mr. Washburn had sent him the page proofs of the original welcoming article for USSR.

In any case, it was clear that the USSR had decided to call off the President's visit as early as May 6.

Continuing his briefing, Mr. Dulles reported strong indications that Mikoyan was in disfavor. Mikoyan had not been in Moscow since May 6 and the story that he is "on vacation" is a little peculiar. Mr. Dulles said he had reports as early as March that Khrushchev had called Mikoyan a turncoat who would do anything to save himself. It had also been reported that Khrushchev and Mikoyan engaged in a bitter dispute over the handling of the U-2 incident by the USSR. Mikoyan had more knowledge of the West than any other high Soviet leader and believed in dealing with the West instead of following a harsh Stalinist line. During Mikoyan's absence from Moscow, Suslov, who has long been considered an advocate of a harsh policy toward the West, has attained increased prominence. Another meeting of the Communist Party Central Committee, scheduled for the near future, may provide more definite evidence of what the Soviet position toward the West will be in the future. Mr. Dulles said that evidence now pointed toward continued rule by Khrushchev but that bets on Khrushchev should be hedged.

Mr. Dulles reported that Communist China was publicly demonstrating its support for the position which the USSR had taken at Paris. The Chinese Communists were also regarding the U-2 incident and developments at Paris as a vindication of their interpretation of American motives. They were saying "Our view of the situation was the correct one and we were not misled by superficial phenomena." The Chinese Communists still

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have a lingering fear that Khrushchev will not stand firm and that he will be mislead by the West. Tito has been violently attacked by the Soviet periodical KOMMUNIST. Mr. Dulles then noted that it was possible Ambassador Menshikov could not return to the U.S.; a number of crates containing his household effects had apparently been loaded on board ship in New York.

Mr. Dulles noted that he had prepared detailed analyses of the foreign press reaction to the break-up of the Summit meeting. These analyses could be summarized by the statement that the European press had been favorable toward the U. S. position while the press in neutralist countries had been both critical of the U.S. because of the U-2 over-flights and critical of Khrushchev for breaking off the Summit Conference.

Turning to Turkey, Mr. Dulles reported that tension between the government and the opposition was a continuing danger. The personal feud between Inonu and Premier Menderes had now become a constitutional crisis. Student demonstrations had increased and non-students were now joining in the rioting. Even some military personnel is participating in the demonstrations. There appears to be considerable antagonism between the Turkish police and Turkish military forces. The Turkish Army is divided, with senior officers inclined to remain loyal to the government and lower level officers divided between the government and the opposition. Premier Menderes apparently does not realize the extent of discontent. Mr. Dulles believed that the Turkish situation would deteriorate further and that it was even possible that the army would eventually take over.

Mr. Dulles said that Prince Souphanouvong and twelve other Neo Lao Hak Xat leaders had escaped from prison in Laos, probably by bribery of the guards. The escape of these pro-Communists would probably be the signal for increased anti-government activity by the Communists and their sympathizers. In this connection Mr. Dulles remarked that in his Berlin speech Khrushchev had said that he could speak for the Warsaw Pact countries, which would not aggravate the international situation, but that he could not speak for all socialist countries.

The President said Chinese Communists' boasting and arrogance always puzzled him because it seemed to him that Communist China was among all the countries of the world most vulnerable to a nuclear holocaust. Nevertheless, Communist China appeared to be one of the most truculent countries in the world.

The National Security Council:

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to an analysis of Sino-Soviet Bloc positions since the Paris heads-of-government meeting; and developments in Turkey and Laos.

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3. STATEMENTS REGARDING THE U-2 INCIDENT AND THE RECENT  
MILITARY TEST ALERT  
(NSC Action No. 2231)

The President said there was a matter he would like to take up with the Council. It was clear that Congress would insist on some kind of investigation of the U-2 incident and the break-up of the Summit Conference. It must be well understood in advance in the Administration how far officials could go in testifying on these matters without endangering our whole intelligence fabric. The U-2 incident was partly out in the open and some questions about over-flights could be answered. However, the President continued, no information should be divulged as to..... Congress could be told that over-flights have been going on with the approval of the Secretary of State and our scientific advisers, who have indicated that this method of gathering intelligence is necessary. It should be made clear that basic decisions respecting reconnaissance over-flights of denied territory have been made by the President. However, the impression should not be given that the President has approved specific flights, precise missions, or the timing of specific flights.

Mr. Dulles said he would prefer in his own testimony not to mention the President in connection with the reconnaissance over-flights.

The President said he had in his press conference already referred to his own role in reconnaissance over-flights. Turning to the timing of the last U-2 flight, the President said there was no good time for failure. The question was: Had the risk been measurably greater at the time of the flight than it would have been at any other time? As Ambassador Lodge had said at the UN Security Council meeting, at the time Khrushchev was making his disarmament speech before the UN last year, the U.S. had taken two Soviet spies into custody. The President believed that as long as a powerful government suspected the intentions of another powerful government, intelligence activities would be carried on. He felt that the possibility of a new Pearl Harbor should not be unduly emphasized, nor should we attempt to be dramatic, but we could state publicly, that intelligence operations are going on and that we are studying methods of obtaining information.

..... He added that the April 9 over-flight could be mentioned publicly since the Soviets had already mentioned it. He repeated that as to timing there was no good time for failure.


The President believed that certain elements in the U.S. would try to make it appear that we had instituted a general

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
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military alert on Sunday night, May 15. All that happened was that Secretary Gates had asked him whether it would not be appropriate at that time to make sure that our long-range communications were working efficiently. He had agreed that such a communications alert might be ordered. This test alert was the kind of alert that is conducted regularly. The President felt that in our public statements we should play down the May 15 alert by indicating that it was a test of our long-range communications facilities. Secretary Gates said that the alert also involved a quiet increase in military command personnel on duty for a test of command procedures.



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The President then referred to the events leading up to the break-up of the Summit Conference. He said that a week prior to the scheduled opening of the Summit Meeting, the Soviet Ambassador had called on General de Gaulle to discuss Summit procedure. General de Gaulle had asked the Ambassador whether the USSR really

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intended to have a Summit Meeting. The Ambassador had replied that not only did the USSR intend to have a Summit Meeting but believed the forthcoming meeting would be a fruitful one. The President said that on Sunday, before the opening of the Summit Meeting, Khrushchev had made no effort to see him but had called upon Macmillan and De Gaulle to show them a letter containing the Soviet demands upon the U.S. This letter formed the basis of Khrushchev's speech the next morning, although Khrushchev had added four or five pages of personal abuse to the letter. Secretary Gates said the Khrushchev letter had already been translated into French at the time Khrushchev called upon De Gaulle, suggesting that Khrushchev was ready to release the letter to the French press.

The President said the idea that we could have done anything to save the Summit Conference was ridiculous. Moreover, the idea that the alert called to test our long-range communications facilities wrecked the Conference was also ridiculous. The President recalled that at the Cabinet Meeting on May 13 he had told the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense that he would cancel the reconnaissance over-flights of the USSR. In Paris it was quickly apparent that Khrushchev did not want only a cessation of the flights; he wanted a cessation of the flights plus an apology plus punishment of those responsible for the flights. Khrushchev's action was taken in order to scuttle the Summit Conference. The President thought it was undesirable to talk too much about what is going on in the Soviet hierarchy because we can only guess at what motivates the Russians. The President, however, felt sure that Khrushchev deliberately decided to blow up the Summit Conference, knowing that he (the President) could not accept the demands Khrushchev made. The President believed that during any investigation, Administration officials should be calm and clear but should not be expansive and should not permit the investigators to delve into our intelligence system.

General Twining believed that an investigation, once started, would seek to explore our whole intelligence operation. He wondered whether there was anything we could do to stop the investigation of the advice which his personal advisers had given him but the forthcoming investigation would deal with Administration officials as well as his personal advisers. Accordingly, he felt the investigation could not be stopped. However, he believed Administration officials should testify themselves and not allow their subordinates to speak. General Twining feared that if the investigators probed CIA, they would then want to investigate the JCS operations. The President said Mr. Dulles would reply to the questions asked by the investigators and might have to say that CIA was a secret organization of the U.S. Government.

Secretary Anderson believed that the President's forthcoming TV address should leave the public with the image of a clear and decisive leader but that it should also say that no apology is due for U.S. efforts to protect the Free World against devastating attack. Moreover, the speech should express the hope that no one in this country will engage in activities which will impair the capability of the country to protect itself in the future. The speech should contain the implication that there is a limit beyond which investigation cannot go without imperiling our security. Secretary Anderson felt that the image of Pearl Harbor was still in the minds of the people and that they would accept this admonition about security.

The President said that upon his return to this country from Paris, he had deliberately talked about the U-2 incident and the Summit at some length at Andrews Field because at that time he did not intend to make a TV speech. Now he was about to make a TV speech and he understood that the State Department was preparing a White Paper. He wondered whether our opponents would not say we were on the defensive if we continue to make speeches and prepare White Papers. Secretary Herter said the proposed State Department White Paper would cover Soviet espionage activities in the U.S. and other Free World countries.

Secretary Anderson asked whether Mr. Dulles had any estimate regarding the fact that the USSR is sending eighteen of its UN officials home. Mr. Dulles said this move might be due to regular rotation. The eighteen officials would be drawn both from the Soviet Embassy and from the UN. The one thing that was clear was that the Soviets did not like the conduct of Ambassador Menshikov. Secretary Herter said the State Department had been studying the projected return of the Soviet Ambassador and the eighteen other Soviet officials and had been able to see no special significance in the move. There was, however, apparently a kind of mass movement going on. The Polish Ambassador appeared to be going home also.

The President wondered whether it would be a good idea for him to mention in his speech the fact that the State Department is preparing a White Paper on the details of Soviet espionage. Secretary Herter said he preferred to wait until the first draft of the White Paper was prepared. There was a question whether the White Paper could contain enough cases to make it worthwhile without compromising [redacted]. Mr. Dulles asked whether the White Paper would

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cover Soviet espionage in allied countries. Mr. Dillon said the White Paper would cover such espionage. The President wondered whether this coverage would require us to clear the White Paper with our allies. Mr. Dillon said information in the White Paper about Soviet espionage in allied countries was drawn from public sources.

The President said we had been the leader for peace in the world. In order to remain the leader, we must remain strong and in order to be strong we must obtain intelligence information.

The National Security Council:

Noted, after discussion of the subject, the following instructions by the President regarding statements by Executive Branch officials in public or in Congressional testimony:

- a. Discussion of the U-2 incident could include information which the USSR is presumed to know, but should not include any information which would jeopardize any other intelligence sources and methods. Statements should be calm and clear, but not expansive as to details or other intelligence activities. It should be emphasized that the policy of the United States is to seek a just and lasting peace, but to pursue that objective from a position of strength which requires intelligence activities to guard against surprise attack. Therefore, there should be no apologies for our effort to protect the Free World from surprise attack, and we should not imply that any other nations were involved in this U-2 activity. While making clear that the basic decision regarding the U-2 program was made by the President, the impression should not be given that the President approved specific flights, their precise missions or their timing.
- b. As to the test alert, it should be made clear that this was of limited scope designed primarily to test long-range communications and command procedures, and that such alerts are necessary to maintain the operational readiness of U.S. armed forces. Authorization was given for more frequent test alerts.

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4. POLICY ISSUES IN THE POST-SUMMIT ENVIRONMENT

Mr. Gray said he understood Secretary Herter was prepared to discuss this subject. Secretary Herter said he had tentatively jotted down a number of policy issues. A problem we will be having with our allies was pointed up by an ambassador who visited him yesterday and asked for his views on the possibility of the ambassador's government taking the initiative in suggesting the re-opening of discussions with the USSR.\* He had told the ambassador it would be better to let the dust settle; any overtures by the West for a re-opening of discussions with the USSR would be regarded by the Soviets as a sign of weakness. Secretary Herter believed that the strength of the alliance lay in its unity and that we should stick to the statement we had made in Paris, that at a suitable time we would be ready to discuss the world situation with the Soviet Union. The President agreed that since the USSR took the responsibility for scuttling the Summit Conference, we should leave the initiative to the Soviets. Khrushchev had said in Paris that the dust had to settle before further discussions could take place. Khrushchev had even referred to our elections and had indicated that he might prefer to deal with the next U.S. Government or even with the government after that.

Secretary Herter said another issue involved the question whether we should take any abrupt action which might be considered unfriendly. He had in mind particularly East-West Exchanges. It was the feeling in the State Department that exchanges of visits between high officials of the U.S. and high officials of the USSR should be called off while the visits of ordinary citizens of either country should not be affected. In this connection, the next planned exchange of high officials involved a trip by Mr. Stans to the Soviet Union and a visit by Kosygin to the U.S. The President believed the general rule was this: We went to the Summit Conference to improve the world situation; the Summit Conference was broken off; but by and large the situation is now about the same as it was before the break-up of the Summit Conference. Most of the remarks made by Khrushchev in his Monday speech that had not appeared in the letter which he showed De Gaulle and Macmillan the day before had referred to him (the President). After Khrushchev's long tirade, when the Secretary of State asked him when the cancellation of the President's visit to Russia would be announced, Khrushchev took off and explained the whole thing over again. Khrushchev made his cancellation of the visit personal. Accordingly, the President felt that if the Soviets desired to send a high official to visit the U.S., we should consider receiving him. Mr. Dillon said it had already been arranged that Kosygin would visit the

\* Secretary Herter was referring to the Italian Ambassador to the U.S.

U.S. Mr. Staats said Kosygin was coming here before Mr. Stans visited the Soviet Union. The President said that in that case he believed it was desirable to wait and see whether Kosygin came. He thought we did not have to formulate a general policy but should be able to handle high-level visits on an ad hoc basis. Secretary Herter said he understood that in any case we would not for the present interfere with the visits of lesser officials or with the travel of private citizens.

Secretary Herter said another issue was the question of resumption or continuation of the nuclear test agreement negotiations.<sup>11</sup> The scientists in Geneva were continuing their international discussions without interruption. He believed that we should continue these negotiations.

Another issue concerned disarmament. The representatives of the Five Western Powers involved in the disarmament negotiations are meeting on May 30 and an East-West disarmament meeting is scheduled for June 7. Secretary Herter believed we should maintain our position with respect to disarmament and continue to participate in the Geneva negotiations, although he believed these negotiations would prove to be sterile and futile, with the USSR stubbornly adhering to its position in preparation for bringing the matter<sup>12</sup> as a propaganda exercise in the UN General Assembly this fall. The President agreed with the views expressed by Secretary Herter, saying that the Soviets not the U.S. should be the ones to make the nuclear test negotiations or the disarmament negotiations futile.

Mr. McCone said the nuclear test suspension negotiations differed from the disarmament negotiations in that a mere extension of the nuclear test talks keeps the U.S. in a strait-jacket. He felt we ought to press for decisions on nuclear testing. If no agreement is reached, the USSR can keep us at the conference table indefinitely while the moratorium on nuclear testing continues. Secretary Herter agreed that the nuclear test suspension negotiations did bring up the whole question of the moratorium on nuclear testing. He also agreed that the U.S. could not continue the Geneva negotiations indefinitely because such a continuation would mean that the USSR is obtaining a moratorium on nuclear testing without giving up anything in return. The President said we must eventually set a time limit for completion of the nuclear test negotiations.

Secretary Herter felt we must continue contingency planning with respect to Berlin, particularly with respect to the possibility that the Soviets might put pressure on the Berlin economy. The President believed it would be desirable to ask for an intelligence estimate on the possibility of Soviet pressure on

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the Berlin economy. He had raised this question with Adenauer but had not been able to elicit a satisfactory response. The President wondered what the Soviets could do to Berlin as a city while remaining within the letter of the international agreements respecting Germany and Berlin. The Berlin airlift of 1949 had barely kept the population of Berlin alive. The President did not know what action we would take if the Soviets cut off Berlin's trade and restricted all transportation to one road. Adenauer always says we must preserve our juridical position. The President felt that we might end up preserving our juridical position while losing Berlin.

Secretary Herter said that economic counter-measures to be taken by the West in the event of Soviet pressure on Berlin's economy were very important. We must have a clear understanding with our allies whether or not they will take economic counter-measures against the Soviet Bloc even at the sacrifice of their trade with East Germany. Mr. Gray asked whether Mr. Merchant's Contingency Planning Group was studying this economic question. Mr. Herter answered in the affirmative. Mr. Gray then reminded the Council that when the existing Berlin crisis first arose, a Contingency Planning Group had been constituted under the chairmanship of Mr. Murphy, who had been succeeded by Mr. Merchant.

Secretary Gates said he had spent two hours on Saturday going over the military contingency planning for Berlin. Unhappily, he found this planning in an unsatisfactory state because the military planning depended at every stage on political decisions which had not yet been made. There was not even a specified commander for Berlin, the appointment of such a commander being dependent on political decisions. Thus while military plans exist, they are, in Secretary Gates' view, really ineffective because so much time would be required to obtain political decisions in the event of Soviet action against Berlin. Secretary Gates wondered whether some political decisions could not be obtained in advance.

Secretary Herter said that if we pressed the British too far in connection with political decisions, the British were inclined to begin thinking over much about the possibility of general war over Berlin. The President said Macmillan had said to him: "Do you want the British to go to war for two million of the people we twice fought wars against and who almost destroyed us?"

Secretary Herter believed the Communists would be increasingly aggressive in the Far East during the coming period, particularly in North Vietnam, North Korea, and the Taiwan Strait. The Russians

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would probably encourage diversionary Communist activity in the Far East and we should be particularly alert for any signs of such activity.

Secretary Herter then turned to the question of enhancing Free World strength. He said he did not know what the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind but he felt that any action showing that we are maintaining and increasing our military strength would be very helpful from the standpoint of foreign policy. Secretary Gates said he had been taking the position that the Defense position was not prepared on the assumption that the USSR would make any significant concessions at the Summit Conference. He believed the Defense budget, as currently approved by the President, was satisfactory, subject of course to continuing review. He saw no need to step up the production of long-lead time items although more maintenance and operations funds could be spent to improve our defense posture. We might also be able to increase the strength of our deployed forces.

The President did not believe it would be desirable to increase the strength of our deployed forces. He said we were trying to be stable in our military planning and to have a ten year military program. We should not get excited every time Khrushchev is guilty of worse than usual deportment. He would have no objection to any quiet actions which would improve our military posture but he did not want to take any military action of a more dramatic nature which could be regarded as being caused by the break-up of the Summit Conference. Secretary Herter said he did not have any panicky actions in mind. The President said that before the break-up of the Summit Conference, he had agreed to eighteen more ATLAS squadrons and to an increase in POLARIS missiles. He felt we should continue these programs and perhaps quietly strengthen them.

Secretary Anderson noted that Administration officials had testified that we would be ready if war came tomorrow. If we should now take military actions which could be attributed to the break-up of the Summit Conference, we would be admitting weakness and causing concern to our allies. Secretary Gates agreed but added that some actions to improve our defense posture could be accomplished quietly with maintenance and operations money. He would not, of course, go to Congress and ask that the deterrent forces be doubled or anything like that. General Twining said our forces were in a better state of readiness at the present time than they had ever been in.

Secretary Herter said our NATO partners are showing an extraordinary degree of solidarity with us at the present time. He

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hoped a decision on POLARIS for NATO would soon be made. Such a decision should be helpful to us from the standpoint of our own contributions to NATO.

Mr. Staats asked how the Administration should react to moves in Congress designed to increase the defense budget. Secretary Gates said he understood Senator Symington had just attempted to add \$4 billion to the defense budget. Any additions to the defense budget made in Congress would deal with the glamorous programs, the long-lead time items. The armed services, except for the Navy, had completed their testimony before Congress on the defense budget.

Secretary Herter said he hoped we would move ahead fast and not back down with respect to the reconnaissance satellite program. In Paris, Khrushchev's reaction had been extraordinary when De Gaulle chided him about the Soviet "space ship" which was going over Paris sixteen to eighteen times a day. Khrushchev said he did not care how many satellites flew over his territory. Secretary Herter thought it would be very useful for our allies and other friendly nations of the Free World to be re-assured that if one kind of reconnaissance against surprise attack had to be suspended, another kind would soon be available. The President agreed and added that in Paris Khrushchev had said that anyone might take all the pictures he wished from satellites over Soviet territory.

Mr. Gray asked what should be the public posture of this government with respect to reconnaissance satellites. Secretary Herter felt we should not adopt a public attitude which would be provocative with respect to our military preparations. Mr. Gray pointed out that his question referred to reconnaissance satellites only, not to military preparations. He added that he understood Senator Jackson had written a letter to the President suggesting that reconnaissance satellites should be turned over to the UN. The President wondered who would develop reconnaissance satellites if they were now to be turned over to the UN. With respect to our public posture on reconnaissance satellites, the President thought it might be useful to quote Khrushchev's statement to the effect that he (Khrushchev) did not care how many pictures of Russian territory we made from satellites. Secretary Herter said one problem might arise in connection with quoting Khrushchev; namely, there were no official notes of the meeting in Paris. Each delegation took its own notes. The President said he thought the French preserved a rather complete record of the meeting. In any case, Khrushchev had made the statement in the presence of the President and a number of other people.


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The President then said he would be glad to put reconnaissance satellites at the disposal of the UN if every nation would follow suit. Mr. Gray said he was not advocating this policy. With respect to questions that might be asked about reconnaissance satellites, the President thought that Administration officials need not attempt to reply to every question which some idiot was able to ask. He felt it would be enough to quote Khrushchev's statement.

The Vice President wished to make two additional comments. In the first place, he thought it would be an error for this government to take the initiative in changing the policy on East-West Exchanges even as concerns visitors at the highest level. Khrushchev was the aggressor in breaking up the Summit Meeting; if the Soviets wished to stop East-West Exchanges, we should leave it to them to take the initiative in chilling the atmosphere. In the second place, certain elements of the press in this country, particularly the press opposed to the Administration, was trying to make it appear that the Administration was afraid of an investigation of the U-2 incident and the break-up of the Summit Conference. The contrary was the truth. The Administration is not fearful of an investigation and at such a time it is important to give the people confidence. The people would lose confidence if they thought the Administration were afraid of an investigation. Accordingly, the Administration should make it clear that it is happy to cooperate with Congress in a study of the U-2 incident and the break-up of the Summit Meeting, our only reservation being that we cannot compromise intelligence sources or methods. We must assume that Congress is a responsible body and will conduct its investigation in a responsible manner. We should stand behind all we have done and not in any way give the impression that we are resisting an investigation or that we believe it would be bad for the country. In conclusion, the Vice President said of course he would not like to see headlines in the world press portraying the U.S. as a divided country. Secretary Herter and the President were inclined to agree with the Vice President's remarks.

However, the President added that some investigators were masters at beguiling witnesses and trying to find out all about our intelligence systems. The Vice President felt that Mr. Dulles would be able to close the door on attempts to expose our intelligence systems. Secretary Herter said he was now scheduled to appear before both the Jackson Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee.


The Vice President said he had one other point with respect to the President's announcement that reconnaissance over-flights would be discontinued. Many people are saying that the earlier announcements of this government stated that the flights would be continued. These announcements did not, of course, make such a statement. The Vice President felt we should now say that any intelligence sources which are compromised are less useful and should not be used; we should not say that we are discontinuing the flights as a concession to Khrushchev. The Vice President felt this point should be emphasized by Secretary Herter and Mr. Dulles in their testimony before Congressional committees.




Secretary Gates remarked that he had already told the press that the Department of Defense had no responsibility for the U-2 operation and that, accordingly, he had received no orders for its discontinuance. He recalled the President's statement at the Cabinet Meeting, that the flights would be suspended, but did not interpret this statement as an order to him. The President said that, of course, in a matter of this kind he received advice from various sources, one of which was the military.

Mr. Gray asked whether any additional discussion was needed as to how the test alert called by Secretary Gates should be publicly described. Secretary Gates felt the article by Arthur Krock in that morning's NEW YORK TIMES was a good description of the alert. He also thought the alert would rapidly become a dead issue. General Twining emphasized that alerts were militarily necessary and believed that we should call alerts so often that the newspapers would get tired of covering them and would

no longer pay attention when an alert was directed. Secretary Gates said a comprehensive readiness test of the military forces would be conducted during the first week in June. The President said he saw no reason why such a test should not be conducted. Reverting to the alert ordered by Secretary Gates from Paris, the President believed we should say that that alert had no significance other than a test of new communication links and that, in fact, we were going to try another military alert next week.



Mr. Washburn said USIA had been studying world opinion since the break-up of the Summit Meeting. It appeared that both the USSR and the U.S. had lost some of the world's confidence as a result of the Paris meeting, but the USSR had lost more of the world's confidence than the U.S. World opinion appeared to be worrying a great deal over what would happen next. Mr. Washburn thought world opinion might be re-assured if the President in his TV speech could say we intended to press forward toward an easing of world tension, to continue disarmament negotiations, and to help rebuild U.S. leadership. Secretary Harter said the statement issued by the Three Allies at the end of the Summit Meeting appeared to cover this matter. The President said he disliked saying that we had lost leadership. We ought, of course, to be developing our position of leadership, but we should not imply that we had lost it because Khrushchev walked out of the Summit Meeting.



The Vice President noted that in terms of world opinion and U.S. opinion any discussion which concentrated primarily on the past would induce people to think about the past rather than about the future and about the real culprit in Paris, namely Khrushchev. The only way to focus attention on the future instead of the past was to change the subject of public discussion from the break-up of the Summit to Khrushchev's probable actions with respect to Berlin, the Near East, the Far East, and Africa. We should focus attention on what Khrushchev may do in the future and what we are going to do to counteract his moves. We should talk about the future instead of the past.

The President said it was easy to get a distorted view of the world if one lived in Washington. He was currently receiving a very heavy volume of mail which indicated that the people are relieved that we were able to conduct reconnaissance over-flights and that one of our planes could penetrate Soviet territory to the extent of some 1500 miles. The Vice President agreed that at the present time public opinion was favorable to the Administration but believed that the poison of some Washington opinion-makers would slowly act on the people, who would then begin to wonder how we got into the present situation. The Vice President would like to leave the present picture regarding the U-2 and the Summit Meeting unchanged and start talking about something else. He repeated his belief that any U.S. initiative to change the East-West Exchange program would be wrong.

Secretary Herter felt we must stay on the offensive with respect to the contrast between our early denial and later avowal of U-2 activities. We might ask should we have kept on lying and got ourselves into a deeper hole?

The Vice President noted that some commentators who have refused to take Soviet espionage in the Free World seriously have been screaming about U.S. espionage since the U-2 incident.

General Persons said there were enough Presidential candidates in the Senate to add a great deal of money to the defense budget. We should take particular pains to support those Senators who wish to continue the President's defense budget without a great change. Secretary Gates agreed with this view.

## The National Security Council:

- a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral statement by the Secretary of State as to the position which the U.S. should take on various policy issues.
- b. Noted the President's approval of the following U. S. positions in the post-Summit environment:
  - (1) The President went to the Summit meeting in an effort to achieve some improvement in the international situation. Despite the break-up of the Summit meeting by Khrushchev, the international situation should be considered by and large to remain essentially as it was before the Paris meeting.
  - (2) U.S. allies should be advised that the initiative for further high-level meetings to improve the international situation must come from the Soviets, since Khrushchev scuttled the Summit meeting and efforts by our allies in this regard would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
  - (3) In general, the United States should continue its policy regarding the East-West exchange program, including agreed exchanges of high-level officials. Any change in that program should be the result of Soviet initiative, thereby placing the onus for change on the Soviets. In the event of such change consideration of the exchange of high-level officials should be on a case-by-case basis.
  - (4) The United States should maintain its current position on the reduction and control of armaments, and should be prepared to continue participation in the Geneva negotiations on that subject. If the negotiations should prove futile, it should be clearly the responsibility of the Soviets for causing this result.
  - (5) The United States should continue to seek completion of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing, but should make clear that these negotiations and the U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing cannot go on indefinitely without decision. The United States should determine at what time or at what stage of these negotiations it should seek to place a time limit on their duration.
  - (6) The United States should continue its studies and preparations for possible contingencies relating to Berlin, since Khrushchev, despite his recent speech disavowing action on Berlin for six or eight months, may still make some unexpected move, possibly an effort to put pressure on the Berlin economy. It was noted that the State-

Defense-JCS-CIA planning group, under the chairmanship of Under Secretary of State Merchant, was engaged in a restudy of Berlin contingency planning, including the possibility of economic pressures on Berlin.

- (7) The United States should be on the alert for the possibility of aggressive Sino-Soviet Bloc activity in the Far East, especially by the Chinese Communists.
- (8) The military program as currently approved by the President continues to provide for an adequate defense posture in the post-Summit environment. However, certain operational steps to improve the state of readiness of U.S. forces should be considered in the ordinary course, but any changes deemed necessary should be undertaken quietly without unnecessary publicity.